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Abstract 
 
The Scottish Parliament has the authority to make a balanced-budget expansion or contraction 
in public expenditure, funded by corresponding local changes in the basic rate of income tax 
of up to 3p in the pound. This fiscal adjustment is known as the Scottish Variable Rate of 
income tax, though it has never, as yet, been used. In this paper we attempt to identify the 
impact on aggregate economic activity in Scotland of implementing these devolved fiscal 
powers. This is achieved through theoretical analysis and simulation using a Computable 
General Equilibrium (CGE) model for Scotland. This analysis generalises the conventional 
Keynesian model so that negative balanced-budget multipliers values are possible, reflecting a 
regional “inverted Haavelmo effect”. Key parameters determining the aggregate economic 
impact are the extent to which the Scottish Government create local amenities valuable to the 
Scottish population and the extent to which this is incorporated into local wage bargaining.  
 
JEL Numbers: C68, D58, H71, R13, R23 
 
Key words: Fiscal federalism, devolution, regional wage bargaining and migration, Scotland, 
regional computable general equilibrium analysis. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In 1997 the Scottish people voted to create a Scottish legislative assembly and to endow that 
body with tax-varying powers. Subsequently the Scotland Act (1998) established the Scottish 
Parliament and gave it the authority to make a balanced-budget expansion or contraction in 
public expenditure. This local fiscal adjustment would be funded by corresponding local 
changes in the basic rate of income tax of up to 3p in the pound. This is known as the Scottish 
Variable Rate of income tax, though it has never, as yet, been used. In this paper we attempt to 
identify and quantify the impact on aggregate economic activity in Scotland of implementing 
these devolved fiscal powers. This is achieved through theoretical analysis and simulation 
using a Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model for Scotland. 
 
The bulk of the funding for the Scottish Parliament comes through a block grant from the UK 
Government determined by the Barnett formula (Bell et al, 1997; Christie and Swales, 2010). 
According to official data, Scotland has higher per capita public expenditure than England and 
is generally thought to receive a substantial positive net fiscal transfer from the rest of the 
UK.1
 
 This leads most commentators to believe that for Scotland the power to change the 
standard rate of income tax is, in practice, restricted to the power to increase it (Blow et al, 
1996; McGregor et al 1997). We therefore focus here specifically on the consequences for the 
Scottish economy of a balanced-budget fiscal expansion.  
Since Scottish devolution there has been an active, and often animated, debate about the 
funding of those expenditures controlled by the Scottish Parliament (Ashcroft et al, 2006; Bell, 
2000; Christie and Swales, 2010; Cuthbert, 1998, 2001; Gallacher and Hinze, 2005; Hallwood 
and MacDonald, 2005, 2006; McLean and McMillan, 2003; Midwinter 1999, 2002)).2
                                                 
1 The size of Scotland’s fiscal balance is not uncontested and depends on the treatment of the taxation associated 
with the extraction of North Sea oil (Scottish Government, 2010).  
 The 
Commission on Scottish Devolution (2009), chaired by Kenneth Calman, inter alia 
recommends that the extent to which the Scottish Government can vary the rates on a number 
of existing taxes should be significantly extended. The most important is income tax and the 
the report proposed a variation of up to 10p in the pound. But the key recommendation was 
 
2 This debate includes discussion of the appropriateness of the Barnett Formula, the desirability of a more 
explicit needs-based funding formula and the arguments for greater fiscal autonomy.  
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that the Scottish Parliament be forced to choose the appropriate income tax rate rather than 
have the present default position of accepting the rate set at the UK level. In the budget of 
2010, the Coalition Government affirmed its commitment to implement the proposals of the 
Calman Commission in Scotland. A similar position had been taken in the Labour 
Government’s budget earlier in the same year.3
 
  
In this paper we concentrate on the impact of the operation of the Scottish Variable Rate. 
However, the recommendations of the Calman Commission relating to the expanded powers 
for devolved income tax setting are essentially as analysed here, except that the size of the 
allowable tax change will be increased. An obvious reference point for our analysis is the 
fiscal federalism literature (Cornes and Sandler, 1996, ch. 11; Oates, 1972, 1999;). However, 
the micro-theoretic literature assumes that greater fiscal autonomy will have a neutral impact 
on regional macro-economies. We argue that there can be no such presumption in the UK 
regional context. Further, it is not possible, a priori, to determine the sign of the change in 
regional activity that would be generated by a balanced budget fiscal expansion at the regional 
level.  
 
Section 2 outlines our theoretical approach. We adopt an explicitly general equilibrium variant 
of the disaggregated Layard et al. (1991) model, augmented to allow for the effect on regional 
wage determination and migration of regional-specific tax-funded amenities. Section 3 uses 
this analysis to generalise the conventional Keynesian balanced-budget multiplier model. In 
this setting, negative balanced-budget multipliers values are possible, reflecting a regional 
“inverted Haavelmo effect” (Haavelmo, 1945; Knoester and van der Windt, 1987). Section 4 
identifies the structure of AMOS, a Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model 
parameterized on data for Scotland. This is a fleshed out version of the skeletal theoretical 
model set out in Section 3,. Section 5 reports the simulation results for the impact of the 
introduction of the Scottish Variable Rate on long-run equilibria, and Section 6 explores a 
number of extensions. Section 7 concludes with the implications for future research and for the 
                                                 
3 The Independent Commission on Funding and Finance for Wales (2010), chaired by Gerry Holtham has 
similarly argued, inter alia, for the Welsh Assembly to have the power to change the basic rate of income tax 
imposed locally. Other commentators argue for more radical changes within Scotland with a move towards full 
fiscal autonomy (Hallwood and MacDonald, 2005, 2006). Such a radical change is outwith the scope of this 
paper.  
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wider debate on regional fiscal issues. 
 
2. THE THEORETICAL MODEL  
 
We adopt a long-run, open-economy model of the region which is in the spirit of the 
disaggregated approach developed by Layard et al. (1991, ch. 6) with imperfect competition in 
the regional labour market. We employ the small-region assumption that the price of imports 
and the cost of capital are both determined exogenously in perfectly integrated 
national/international markets. However, we do not impose the law of one price for the 
region's exports but rather employ conventional trade functions (Armington, 1969; Engle and 
Rogers, 1996). That is to say, whilst output is produced under conditions of perfect 
competition within the region, it is not a perfect substitute for the output of other regions.4
 
 
This permits adjustments in the price of the regional good relative to the price of extra-
regional goods and allows variation in the regional real and nominal wage in the long run. 
Production occurs under a well-behaved, linear homogeneous production function with two 
factors, capital and labour. Households are assumed to be homogeneous, so that there is no 
distinction between workers and citizens or migrants and non-migrants. In this section and the 
next we focus on a comparative-static long-run analysis where equilibrium implies that both 
the regional capital stock and population are optimally adjusted. There is zero net investment 
and zero net migration in long-run equilibrium states. We adopt the Layard et al (1991) 
regional migration function, in which net migration is a positive function of the inter-regional 
relative real wage and employment rates.5
 
 Capital stock is fully adjusted when actual and 
desired capital stocks in all sectors are equal.  
We approach the analysis of the balanced-budget fiscal expansion (henceforth fiscal 
expansion) in the following way. The precise composition of the additional expenditure to be 
financed by the Scottish Variable Rate is unknown. However, we assume such a fiscal 
                                                 
4  Layard et al (1991, ch. 6) also assume competitive commodity markets in their exposition of disaggregated 
labour markets.  
 
5 This function has its roots in Harris and Todaro (1970) and has been widely employed elsewhere. See for 
example Greenwood et al (1991) and Treyz et al (1993) for applications in a U.S. context, and Bradley et al 
(1995) and Ermisch (1995) for Irish studies. 
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expansion has a positive demand-side impact on regional output through a variant of the 
standard balanced budget multiplier. However, there are likely to be accompanying negative 
supply-side effects. In particular, we assume that the increased government expenditure 
generates a regional-specific amenity whose existence is generally reflected in a shift in the 
zero net migration function (Tiebout, 1956). We argue that in an imperfectly competitive 
labour market the fiscal expansion also affects the real wage bargaining function. We focus on 
the key role played by the nature of these labour market effects in determining changes in 
aggregate regional activity consequent upon the introduction of the fiscal expansion. We begin 
with a more detailed specification of our analytical model. 
 
Equation (1) is the zero net migration condition. It identifies the set of values of the post-tax 
real consumption wage, w, and the employment rate, e, for which net migration is zero:  
(1 ) ( ) 0;1 0; 1; , 0ew z e z w w
β
β ττ β τ= − ≥ > ≥ < ≤     (1) 
whereτ is the proportionate rate of income tax and β is a parameter indicating the degree to 
which households value public, as against private, consumption. Equation (1) indicates that 
there is a negative relationship between the post-tax real wage and the employment rate: across 
zero net migration (long-run) equilibria, a high local wage is compensated for by a low local 
employment rate. However, equation (1) is rather unconventional in that it includes the term 
βτ )1( − in an attempt to capture the effect on the migration decision of the locally financed 
amenity. 
 
Where individuals attach no value to this amenity, β = 0 and the standard formulation of the 
net migration condition applies, with the post-tax real consumption wage governing migration 
decisions. However if, as is emphasised in the literature on fiscal federalism, there is a positive 
amenity effect, then β > 0, and the value of this parameter measures the potential migrant's 
relative marginal valuation of public expenditure versus private consumption. For a given 
employment rate, this implies that the larger the value of β, the lower the post-tax real 
consumption wage required to preclude net outmigration.  When β = 1, the potential migrant is 
indifferent between marginal changes in local public expenditure and private consumption so 
that in this case the pre-tax real consumption wage drives migration.6
                                                 
6 That is to say, the individual is indifferent between £1 marginal private consumption and the public good 
implications of paying £1 more in tax. 
 Where, β > 1 there is a 
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positive marginal preference for local public expenditure over private consumption. 
 
The pre-tax nominal wage (W) is defined in equation (2): 
τ−
⋅
=
1
cpiwW     (2) 
where cpi is the regional consumer price index defined as: 
( ) 10 ≤<= WcpiWcpicpi  (3) 
Equation (3) expresses the regional consumer price index as a function solely of the regional 
nominal wage. This parsimonious specification is permitted by the import-price and cost-of-
capital exogeneity assumptions, together with the linear homogeneous nature of production.   
 
Labour demand is given as a function of the nominal pre-tax wage and the tax rate, so that:  
( ), 0; 0Wn n W n nττ= > <     (4) 
It is important to note that equation (4) represents a general equilibrium relationship, 
constructed on the basis of full income endogeneity. Labour demand is negatively related to 
the nominal pre-tax wage through competitiveness and factor substitution effects.7
   
 On the 
other hand, labour demand is a positive function of the tax rate as a reflection of the operation 
of the conventional Keynesian balanced budget multiplier, the differential import propensities 
of public and private consumption expenditure, and the greater labour intensity of public 
sector activity.  
Finally, through the bargaining function, the real consumption wage is positively related to the 
regional employment rate (Layard et al, 1991): 
( )1 ( ) 0, , , 0,0 1ew b e b w w w
αβ
α β ττ α= − > ≤ ≤ ≤     (5) 
In this formulation of the regional bargaining function, the local amenity generated by the 
expenditure is allowed to influence wage bargaining behaviour directly.  The parameter α, 
which takes a value between 0 and 1, reflects the extent to which the value of the amenity is 
taken into account in the wage bargaining process. 
                                                                                                                                                         
 
7 Silvestre (1990) describes this general equilibrium labour demand curve as the "full" demand curve for labour. 
No nominal inertia is implied by this formulation, which is a re-parameterised version of a specification in which 
labour demand is a declining function of the real product wage. 
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The possible amenity effects on the local bargained real wage appear to be neglected in the 
literature on fiscal federalism.  This is partly attributable to that literature's typical presumption 
of competitive labour markets. In such a situation, since the amenity provision is exogenous to 
the individual worker, it is ignored in the individual's work/leisure choice, so that only the 
post-tax real consumption wage matters.8
 
  This corresponds to a situation where the value of α 
is zero.  However, in the bargaining context the public good externality will be internalised in 
so far as local unions cover a significant section of the labour force and act co-operatively. 
Given that the scale of the amenity (under the proposed form of the Scottish Variable Rate) is 
tied directly to income and therefore to the bargained wage, the value of α will rise above zero. 
This formulation of the wage-setting function has echoes of the "social wage" that enjoyed 
some currency under earlier UK Labour administrations, although here the effect is region-
specific. 
3. THE THEORETICAL ANALYSIS OF THE SCOTTISH VARIABLE RATE AND 
OTHER FISCAL INNOVATIONS 
 
3.1 Regional Bargained Real Wage and Flow Migration Equilibria 
 
If equations (1)-(5) are expressed in total differentials, the change in the five endogenous 
variables dn, de, dcpi, dw and dW, can be determined, given the change in the value of the 
exogenous tax rate, dτ. The normalisation adopted is to set the initial values of w, W, and cpi 
equal to unity and τ equal to zero. The relevant total differential equations are given in 
Appendix 1. 
 
 A key variable in the analysis is the change in regional competitiveness that accompanies the 
fiscal expansion. In the present model, this is identified by the change in the nominal pre-tax 
wage, dW. This, together with the change in the employment rate, is determined by the 
interaction of the migration and bargaining functions (equations 1 and 5), suitable adopted to 
convert the change in real consumption wage to the change in nominal pre-tax wage. 
Combining equations (1), (2) and (3) produces the expression: 
                                                 
8 The labour supply decision could, of course, be influenced by the amenity if, for example, the amenity were 
complementary to leisure. 
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1
1 1
e
W W
zdW de d
cpi cpi
β τ−= +
− −
 (6) 
If dτ is set equal to zero, equation (6) gives the initial zero net migration (ZNM) function in the 
change in nominal pre-tax wage-employment rate space. This is represented by the curve Z0 in 
Figure 1, which has a slope equal to ze/(1-cpiW) < 0 and passes through the origin. 
 
Similarly, combining equations (2), (3) and (5) expressed as total differentials gives: 
1
1 1
e
W W
bdW de d
cpi cpi
αβ τ−= +
− −
 (7) 
Again, setting dτ to zero in equation (7) produces the initial bargained real wage function 
(BRW) with a slope equal to be/(1-cpiW) > 0 which also passes through the origin. This is 
curve B0 in Figure 1. 
 
Equations (6) and (7) are sufficient to tie down the change in the employment rate and 
nominal wage, de and dW, that accompany the fiscal expansion, dτ: 
(1 ) 0
e e
de d
b z
β α τ−= − ≤
−
 (8) 
and 
(1 ) (1 )
(1 )( )
e e
W e e
b zdW d
cpi b z
β αβ
τ
− − −
=
− −
 (9) 
It is useful to analyse these results diagrammatically using Figure 1. Where a local income tax 
increase of dτ is levied, the ZNM function (equation 6) moves vertically by an amount equal to 
((1-β)/(1-cpiW))dτ. The tax increase also shifts the BRW function vertically, but by ((1-αβ)/(1-
cpiW))dτ. Note that the parameter restrictions imply that 1-αβ ≥1-β so that the BRW function 
cannot experiences a smaller upward movement than the ZNM function. We consider the 
impact of the fiscal expansion under alternative assumptions about the labour market. 
 
3.1.1 A single regional bargain: α = 1 
 
Begin where α = 1, so that the amenity value of the public expenditure is fully reflected in the 
bargaining equation. This would apply where the whole workforce is covered by a single 
bargain. In this case the ZNM and the BRW functions both move vertically by the same 
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amount. There is no change in the employment rate, (de=0), so that the equilibrium lies on the 
dW axis, that is on the line AJ0C in Figure 1.  
 
Consider the extreme situation where together with α = 1, simultaneously β = 0. This is where 
the additional public expenditure produces an amenity that has no value to local residents.  
Under these conditions, both the ZNM and the BRW functions shift upwards by dτ/(1-cpiW) to 
B1 and Z1 respectively and the equilibrium is at A. The change in the pre-tax nominal wage is 
dτ/(1-cpiW) so that the full tax increase is incorporated into higher nominal wages, including an 
element (1-cpiW)-1 to accommodate the increase in regional cpi.  
 
Another benchmark is where α = 1 together with β = 1, so that the value of the increased 
public expenditure to local residents just equals the forgone private consumption implied by 
the higher taxes. Under these circumstances, with α also equal to unity, neither the ZNM nor 
the BRW curve moves. There is simply a transfer of a part of the pre-tax wage from private to 
public expenditure: there is no change in the employment rate and no loss of competitiveness 
through higher nominal wages. The new equilibrium remains at the origin. As the value of β 
varies between zero and one, the equilibrium moves between points A and the origin, 0. If the 
value of β is greater than unity, so that the residents have a positive preference for public as 
against private consumption, the ZNM and BRW functions move downwards so that the 
nominal pre-tax wage will actually fall and the equilibrium would be at a point such as C.   
 
3.1.2 Perfectly competitive labour market: α = 0 
 
Where the labour market is perfectly competitive, α = 0. From equation (7) this means that in 
Figure 1, for any value of β the BRW curve moves upwards by the amount dτ/(1-cpiW) to B1. 
The subsequent competitive labour market equilibrium will lie on this line, ADMLE. Where 
the public amenity has no value, so that β = 0, the ZNM curve moves upwards by the same 
amount as the BRW curve, to Z1 and the new equilibrium is at A with the change in the 
nominal pre-tax wage as dτ/(1-cpiW). Where public consumption is valued equally with private 
consumption, so that β = 1, the ZNM curve remains static at Z0, the new equilibrium is at D. 
Using equation (9) and substituting in the values α = 0 and β = 1 gives the result that at D the 
change in the nominal pre-tax wage is positive and is given as:  
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0
(1 )( )
e
W e e
z ddW
cpi b z
τ
= − >
− −
 (10) 
so that regional competitiveness falls. Values of β between zero and one generate equilibria 
along the line segment AD and values of β greater than 1 lead to equilibria further down the 
BRW function B1, to points such as M, L and E. 
 
3.1.3 The general case of imperfectly competitive labour market: 1 ≥ α ≥  0 
 
The previous two subsections investigate two extreme labour market cases: that is, where the 
regional labour market is perfectly competitive (α = 0) or where it is covered by a single 
regional bargain (α = 1). Between these two extremes, the extent to which the value of the 
public consumption that is financed by the local income tax will be incorporated in the wage 
bargain (the value of α) can lie between zero and unity. For a particular value of β, the 
associated change in the nominal wage and employment rate lie on the appropriate ZNM line. 
For example, if the value of β is unity, the appropriate ZNM function is Z0. The equilibrium 
will lie on the line 0HD, where the closer the value of α is to unity, the closer the equilibrium 
is to the origin. On the other hand, where the value of α is close to zero, the equilibrium is 
closer to D. For lower values of β (1>β≥0), the ZNM function is above and parallel to 0HD. 
The relevant range of equilibrium values will again lie between the vertical zero employment 
rate change line, AJ0C, and the B1 BRW function ADMLE. The more competitive the labour 
market, the closer the equilibrium will be to the ADMLE curve, whereas the more that 
individual bargains cover a large percentage of the labour market, the closer the equilibrium 
will be to the line AJ0C.  
 
It is clear that the equilibrium must lie in the shaded area in Figure 1. Where 1 ≥ β ≥ 0,  the 
equilibrium is within the darker shaded triangle, AD0. With these parameter restrictions, there 
is only one point where inter-regional competitiveness is not negatively affected by the fiscal 
expansion. This is where α = β = 1, so that public consumption is valued equally to private 
consumption and this valuation is fully reflected in the wage bargaining outcome. This 
equilibrium is at the origin. In every other outcome in the triangle AD0, regional 
competitiveness is reduced. Where β > 1 the possible equilibria are represented by the lighter 
shading. In these cases there are combinations of the BRW and ZNM functions where the 
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change in the nominal wage is negative, so that regional competitiveness could increase with a 
local fiscal expansion. 
 
3.1.4 Changes in employment, dn 
 
The results in Figure 1 give changes in the nominal wage and the employment rate, but our 
central concern is changes in the level of economic activity and specifically changes in 
employment level. In general the employment level and the employment rate diverge because 
the population (and therefore the work force) is endogenous. Figure 1 shows that under a wide 
range of parameter values, a balanced fiscal expansion generates an increase in the nominal 
wage and therefore reduces regional competitiveness. However, where this is the case, the 
change in employment is the result of the trade-off between the positive demand side stimulus, 
generated by the Keynesian balanced budget multiplier, and the potential negative 
competitiveness effects, produced by the higher nominal wage. 
 
This analysis follows that of Knoester and van der Windt (1987) who argue that, at a national 
level, forward tax shifting by workers produces a reduction in competitiveness and therefore a 
possible inverted Haavelmo effect; that is, a negative balanced budget multiplier.  Substituting 
equation (9) into equation (4), expressed in terms of total differentials, gives the employment 
change as; 
  
(1 )( ) ( (1 ) (1 ))
(1 )( )
W e e W e e
W e e
n cpi b z n b zdn d
cpi b z
τ β αβ τ
 − − + − − −
=  − − 
 (11) 
where 
2( ) ( ) ( ), , 0dn dn dn
α β α β
∂ ∂ ∂
≥
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
9
                                                 
9 The actual partial derivatives are given as: 
.  
( ) 0
(1 )( )
W e
W e e
n zdn d
cpi b z
β
τ
α
 ∂
= ≥ ∂ − − 
, 
 
( )( ) 0
(1 )( )
W e e
W e e
n b zdn d
cpi b z
α
τ
β
 −∂
= − ≥ ∂ − − 
 and 
2 ( ) 0
(1 )( )
W e
W e e
n zdn d
cpi b z
τ
α β
 ∂
= ≥ ∂ ∂ − − 
. 
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Clearly the change in employment is positively related to the value of the amenity generated 
by the government expenditure, β, and the extent to which this is reflected in the regional 
bargained wage, α. However, our central concern is the sign of the employment change that 
accompanies a balanced fiscal expansion. Again we approach this both diagrammatically and 
algebraically. 
 
First, setting dn equal to zero in equation (4), again expressed as total differentials, and 
rearranging gives the value for dW for which the fiscal expansion has a zero employment 
impact: 
0
W
ndW d
n
τ τ= − ≥  (12) 
This line is plotted in Figure 1 as GMHJK, where the intercept J on the dW axis is 
W
n d
n
τ τ− . 
All combinations of the change in pre-tax nominal wage and employment rate below GHJK 
produce an increase in employment. 
 
Equilibria involving no increase in the pre-tax nominal wage are unambiguously associated 
with an expansion in employment.  This includes the origin, which would be the equilibrium 
where α = β = 1. Here no price changes accompany the fiscal expansion so that the regional 
economy operates as under the standard Keynesian balanced budget multiplier with dn = nτdτ. 
But there is also a range of equilibria where the change in pre-tax nominal wage is positive, so 
that regional competitiveness falls but employment still rises. The corollary is that as long as 
there is a positive demand side stimulus from the balanced fiscal expansion, so that nτ > 0, 
there is always some set of values for α and β in  the range 1 ≥ α,  β ≥ 0 where employment 
change will be positive. In Figure 1 the equilibria falling in the triangle 0HJ are in this 
category.  
 
An alternative way of approaching this issue is to set dn equal to zero in equation (11), and 
rearrange to generate the combinations of the parameters α and β that produce zero 
employment change. This produces the result that for a positive employment change the β 
parameter must be greater than a minimum value β , given by: 
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(1 ) 1e e W
e e W
b z n cpi
b z n
τβ β
α
 − −
> = + −  
 (13) 
where 0
β
α
∂
<
∂
and 
2
2 0
β
α
∂
>
∂
.10
 
  
Equation (13) is represented schematically in Figure 2. In this diagram the values of α lies 
within the range [ ]0,1α ∈ and whilst in principle β can take any value, we confine our 
attention to positive values and are particularly interested in range [ ]0,1β ∈ .11
 
 Combinations 
of α and β above the zero employment change locus, LNM, generate an increase in 
employment, whilst those below this line are associated with employment decline. We know 
from the analysis earlier in this sub-section, that where α = β = 1 the employment change 
associated with the fiscal expansion is positive. This is given as point P in Figure 2. The zero 
employment change (ZEC) locus therefore lies below this point but its exact position depends 
upon the general equilibrium elasticities nw, nτ and cpiw, together with the bargaining and 
migration parameters be and we.  
There are three interesting general cases, which are specified by the value of the ratio of the 
two general equilibrium employment elasticities, nτ/nW.  These general cases can be linked 
back to Figure 1. The partial derivatives from equation (13) show that the relationship between 
β and α along the ZEC locus in Figure 2 is downward sloping and convex. We are interested 
additionally in the values of β at the end points, that is where α is zero and one, identified as β0 
and β1respectively.  
 
First, if 1
(1 )W W
n
n cpi
τ ≥ −
−
 then employment increases for all positive values of α and β. In 
Figure 1, this corresponds to the situation where the horizontal zero employment line, there 
shown as GMHJK, lies above the point A. In this case the ZEC locus in Figure 2 lies below 
                                                 
10. The actual values are given by e
e e
z
b z
ββ
α α
∂
=
∂ −
 and 
22
2 2
2
( )
e
e e
z
b z
ββ
α α
∂
=
∂ −
. 
 
11. A negative β value indicates a publically generated local amenity that has negative value for residents and 
potential migrants. Whilst it is possible to point to think of examples of such local public expenditure, but these 
are ruled out in this analysis.  
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the origin and therefore outwith the positive quadrant. Second, if 
1
(1 ) (1 )( )
e
W W W e e
n z
cpi n cpi b z
τ− > >
− − −
 then the values of β0 and β1 both lie within the range 
[ ]0 1, 0,1β β ∈ , with β0 > β1. In Figure 1 this corresponds to a situation where the zero 
employment change horizontal line lies between points A and D. Third, if 
(1 )( )
e
W e e W
z n
cpi b z n
τ>
− −
, the value of β0 > 1 and [ ]1 0,1β ∈ . This is the situation depicted in 
Figure 2 where the point L is (0, β0) and M is (1, β1). It also corresponds to the outcome 
represented in Figure 1, where the GMHJK zero employment change line lies between points 
D and L.   
 
3.2 National Wage Bargaining with Regional Flow Migration Equilibrium 
 
In Section 3.1 we have adopted a local real wage bargaining framework for the determination 
of the regional wage.  However, it is often argued that within the UK the regional wage is set 
at the national level, either by national bargaining or through company-wide wage setting in 
multi-plant firms. Expressed in total differentials, equation (5) can be replaced by 0dW = . 
Doing the appropriate substitutions in this case generates the results: 0dcpi = , 0dn n dτ τ= > , 
0dw dτ= − <  and (1 ) 0 1
e
de d iff
z
β τ β−= − > < . Employment increases. However the real 
wage falls by the full amount of the tax change and employment rate rises for values of β less 
than unity, in order to satisfy the zero net migration constraint. Essentially, with national wage 
bargaining there are the familiar expansionary demand effects associated with the shift from 
private consumption to public expenditure, but no adverse competitiveness impacts. 
 
In terms of Figure 1, bargaining function, B0, can be replaced by a zero-change pre-tax 
nominal wage line, which is the de axis, line 0L. The equilibrium is now where the zero net 
migration function cuts the de axis. The equilibrium value of dW is clearly zero but as argues 
above, the change in de depends on the value of β. Where β <1, the equilibrium lies to the 
right of the origin so that de > 0. Where β >1, the equilibrium is to the left of the origin and de 
< 0.  
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3.3 Regional Real Wage Bargaining and Zero Labour Mobility Equilibria 
 
Inter-regional migration has played a central role in the analysis up to this point. However, UK 
regional problems are often linked to restrictions in geographic labour mobility.12
 
 It is 
therefore valuable to investigate the consequences of imposing the limiting case of zero labour 
mobility. 
The implication of removing migration from the analysis is that equation (1) is dropped. The 
nominal wage, employment (and employment rate) are now determined by the interaction of 
the real wage bargaining function, derived as equation (7) in Section 3.1 and the labour 
demand function, equation (4), suitably expressed in total differentials as: 
0, 0W
W W
ndndW d n n
n n
τ
ττ= − ≤ ≥  (14) 
The model is calibrated with the initial labour force set to unity, which implies that with no 
migration de = dn. This result, together with equations (7) and (14), generates the expression 
for the change in total employment and the employment rate as:  
(1 ) (1 )
1
W W
W W e
cpide dn d
cpi b
τη αβ η τ
η
− + −
= =
− −
 (15) 
 
where 0 (1 ) (1 )W Wde iff cpiτη η αβ> − > − − ; 
( ) ( ) ( ), , 0de de de
τη α β
∂ ∂ ∂
>
∂ ∂ ∂
; ( ) 0
W
de
cpi
∂
<
∂
.and 
( ) 0 1e
W
de iff b τη αβη
∂
> + >
∂
.13
                                                 
12 This is not to support the supposed conflict between the bargained real wage function and the zero net 
migration condition implied in Blanchflower and Oswald (1994). But Blanchflower and Oswald’s (1994) 
objection to the Harris-Todaro (1970) function on which the net migration function of Layard et al, (1991) is 
based, does reflect the conventional wisdom in the UK that labour mobility is very low, even though Layard et 
al’s analysis is based on econometrically estimated net migration functions. 
 Equation (15) again shows the net employment impact to be the 
result of two opposing forces. These are the conventional expansionary balanced-budget 
13 The actual values are given by:
1( ) ( ), ,
1 1
W W
W W e W W e
cpide de
cpi b cpi bτ
βη
η η α η
−∂ ∂
= = −
∂ − − ∂ − −
 
( ) ( ),
1 1
W
W W e W W W e
de de
cpi b cpi cpi b
ταη η
β η η
∂ ∂
= − = −
∂ − − ∂ − −
 and 2
(1 )( 1 )( )
(1 )
W e
W W W e
cpi bde
cpi b
τη αβ
η η
− + −∂
=
∂ − −
. For 
high values of αβ the change in employment is negatively related to the elasticity of demand for labour. This is 
because the fiscal injection here generates a fall in the wage which has a bigger positive employment effect, the 
greater the labour demand elasticity. 
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demand shock and the negative competitiveness effects. Employment change will be greater 
the more inelastic the labour demand function, the higher the valuation of public expenditure, 
the greater the extent to which this valuation is incorporated into the bargaining function and 
the lower the feedback of wage changes to the cpi.    
 
The comparison of the impact of the fiscal expansion under zero labour mobility and flow 
equilibrium migration can be studies more fully using Figure 3, which adopts the same 
notation as in Figure 1. Under flow equilibrium migration the equilibrium is at the intersection 
of the bargained real wage and zero net migration functions whilst under zero labour mobility 
it is at the intersection of the bargained real wage and the labour demand function. 
 
In interpreting the results from Figure 3, recall that whilst under the zero mobility case 
changes in employment and the employment rate are identical, under flow migration, this is no 
longer the case. Because the labour force is endogenous under flow migration, it is quite 
possible for the employment rate to fall but the absolute level of employment to rise. However, 
in order to compare the employment change in the two cases it is sufficient to compare the 
change in the nominal wage. From equation (14) it is clear that for the same fiscal injection, 
the outcome with the lowest change in nominal wage will have the highest increase in 
employment. 
 
In Figure 3, the labour demand function is represented by the curve LD. This cuts the de and 
dW axes with the positive values n dτ τ  and 
W
n d
n
τ τ−  respectively. Note that the labour demand 
curve cuts the dW axis at point J, the value for the change in nominal wage which generates 
zero employment change in the model with migration. The correspondingly points at which 
the bargaining functions cut the de and dW axis are (1 )
e
d
b
αβ τ−−  (a negative value) and 
(1 )
(1 )W
d
cpi
αβ τ−
−
 respectively. BA, BB and BC correspond to different values of the combined 
parameter αβ, which represents the value of the public expenditure incorporated into the 
bargaining function. As αβ falls the bargaining function makes a parallel upward shift. Note 
from Figure 1 that B1 represents the RBW function where αβ = 0. 
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Begin with the relatively high value of αβ represented by BA. The equilibrium for the zero 
labour mobility case is at N, representing an increase in employment and the nominal wage. 
However, recall from the discussion in Section 3 that where the parameters lie in the range 1 ≥ 
α,β ≥ 0, the equilibrium with flow migration lies within the triangle AD0. This implies that 
with these parameter restrictions, the equilibrium must be located on the line segment PQ and 
the corresponding change in the nominal wage must be lower than in the zero labour mobility 
case. Therefore where the employment change under zero labour mobility is positive, the long-
run employment increase with flow migration will be higher. Essentially, if the employment 
rate increases where there is zero labour mobility, the introduction of migration will lead to in-
migration, reducing the nominal wage and increasing employment.  
 
The bargaining function BB illustrates a situation where the value αβ is slightly lower. In this 
case the equilibrium with zero labour mobility is at R, and employment falls. However, in this 
case, given that the regional flow migration equilibrium position lies on the line segment TS, 
the change in employment could be positive or negative, depending on the value of β. 
Moreover, with a negative employment change that value could be greater or less than under 
zero labour mobility. 
 
Assign the value of αβ that corresponds to the bargaining function BB the value Β  (<1), so 
that in this case, αβ = Β . Point T identifies the equilibrium where 1,β α= = Β . Alternatively, 
point S is where , 1β α= Β = . This implies that for relatively high values of β the equilibrium 
under flow migration lies in the range TU and employment change will be positive: 
W
ndW d
n
τ τ< − . With lower values of β leading to an equilibrium in the range UR the 
employment change is negative but has a smaller absolute value than with zero labour 
mobility. However with values of β that generate equilibria in the range RS, the employment 
reduction with zero labour mobility is less than with flow migration. In this case the low value 
of β means that the fiscal expansion is associated with out migration, resulting in a higher 
nominal wage. Whilst in this case the employment rate is higher under out migration than zero 
labour mobility, the total employment is lower. 
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With bargaining function BC the value of αβ is further reduced. In this case, the zero labour 
mobility equilibrium is at V, whilst the regional flow migration equilibria lie within the range 
WX. In this case employment falls for both closures but the decline under flow migration is 
greater than with for zero labour mobility because the increase in the nominal wage is greater.  
 
4. COMPUTABLE GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM MODELLING WITH A SCOTTISH 
MODEL 
 
4.1 Regional Computable General Equilibrium Modelling 
 
General equilibrium numerical simulation augments the analysis by providing a more 
extensive treatment. The use of CGE models to identify the likely impacts of fiscal 
innovations is well established both at the national (e.g. Shoven and Whalley, 1992) and 
regional (e.g. Hirte, 1998; Jones and Whalley, 1988; Morgan et al. 1989) levels.14
 
 In this case, 
CGE analysis is particularly appropriate for a number of reasons. First, it is clear from the 
analysis in the previous subsections that the key general equilibrium elasticities determine not 
just the quantitative but also the qualitative characteristics of the balanced fiscal expansion 
equilibrium. Such elasticities are difficult to determine without general equilibrium simulation. 
Second, the analytical model gives only long-run equilibrium values: it tells us nothing about 
the time path to this equilibrium. Third, a CGE model gives the change in values for a wide 
range of aggregate variables and allows for sectoral disaggregation. 
However, one problem in tackling this issue through simulation is that existing UK empirical 
work on regional wage and migration functions offers no direct evidence on the parameter 
values α and β since the UK has no experience of a local income tax. Furthermore, there is no 
consensus on the nature of long-run tax effects on the bargained real wage even at the national 
level (Church et al, 1993), and the relevance of such evidence to the present regional context 
is, in any case, questionable. Further, whilst there is evidence from other countries on values 
of α and β, the results are extremely mixed and appear to depend on the composition of public 
expenditures. (Bartik, 1992; Cebula, 2002; Dahlberg and Fredriksson, 2001; Dalenberg and 
Partridge, 1995; Day, 1992; Fisher, 1997; Feld and Kirchgassner, 2002; Gabe and Bell, 2004; 
                                                 
14 For a general review of CGEs see Shoven and Whalley (1992). Partridge and Rickman (1998) provides a 
critical review of the literature on regional CGEs. 
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Helms, 1985; Mofidi and Stone, 1990; Wallace, 1993). 
 
The available empirical evidence therefore does not allow us to tie down the values of α and β 
at all precisely. However, our reading of the literature is that the tendency of conventional 
neoclassical analysis to ignore the potentially beneficial impacts of regional public 
expenditures is rejected by those studies that provide a balanced treatment of tax and 
expenditure effects (e.g. Gabe and Bell, 2004). Furthermore, the suggestion that the 
composition of expenditures influences the values of key parameters implies that they are 
sensitive to policy choices. 
 
Against this background, there is a strong case for progressing the analysis via numerical 
simulation as long as the sensitivity of the results to the values taken for α and β is a central 
feature. However, qualitative and quantitative results concerning the change in the level of 
economic activity associated with a balanced budget expansion typically depend upon the 
entire empirical general equilibrium system, as well as the values of α and β. Using a regional 
CGE model, we are able to estimate the likely size of these effects via simulation over a 
plausible range of values for α and β. This allows us to identify the combinations of these 
parameter values associated with positive and negative balanced-budget employment 
multipliers. 
 
4.2 AMOS: A macro-micro model of Scotland 
 
AMOS is a CGE modelling framework parameterised on data from Scotland.15  Essentially, it 
is a fully specified, empirical implementation of the skeletal theoretical model developed in 
Sections 2 and 3.  It has three domestic transactor groups, namely the personal sector, 
corporations and government; and four major components of final demand: consumption, 
investment, government expenditure and exports. There are eleven commodities/activities but 
in the simulation results reported in Tables 1, 2 and 3, these are aggregated into three broad 
industrial groups: manufacturing, non-manufacturing traded and a sheltered sector.16
                                                 
15 AMOS is an acronym for A Macro-micro Model Of Scotland.  The model is calibrated using a Social 
Accounting Matrix based around the 2004 Scottish Input-Output Tables (Scottish Government 2007). 
 
 
16  The sectors are aggregated as follow.  Non-manufacturing traded: Agriculture, Forestry & Fishing, (AGR); 
Mining, (MIN); Energy and Water, (ENE); Construction, (CON); Distribution & Catering, (DIS); Transport & 
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Consumption and investment decisions reflect intertemporal optimization with perfect 
foresight (Lecca et al, 2010). The detailed treatment is given in Appendix 2. Real government 
expenditure is equal to the base year level plus an additional amount that just exhausts the 
increment to tax revenue raised by the local income tax. This implies that government 
expenditure becomes dependent on the entire general equilibrium of the system, which is 
exactly what would happen if the Scottish Variable Rate were to be implemented. The demand 
for Scottish Rest of the UK (RUK) and Rest of the World (ROW) exports is determined via 
conventional export demand functions where the price elasticity of demand is set at 2.0. 
Imports are obtained through an Armington link (Armington, 1969) and therefore relative-
price sensitive with trade substitution elasticities of 2.0 (Gibson, 1990). 
 
In all the simulations in this paper we impose a single Scottish labour market characterised by 
perfect sectoral mobility. All sectors are taken to be perfectly competitive and produce using 
multi-level CES production functions with elasticities of substitution of 0.3 (Harris, 1989).  
We do not explicitly model financial flows, our assumption being that Scotland is a price-taker 
in competitive UK financial markets.  
 
As regards demographic developments, we assume no natural population change but in the 
default version of the model, the labour force adjusts using the econometrically parameterised 
regional net migration function reported in Layard et al (1991), augmented to accommodate 
the amenity effects discussed in Sections 2 and 3. The model starts in long-run equilibrium 
with zero net migration flow and, in any subsequent period, migration is taken to be positively 
related to the gap between regional and national real tax-adjusted wages, and negatively 
related to the gap between national, and regional unemployment rates: 
0.08 ln( ) ln( ) 0.06 ln ln(1 ) ln
S R
S R
S R
w wm u u
cpi cpi
ς β τ
    
 = − − + − − −     
    
 (16) 
where m is net in-migration as a proportion of the regional population; u is the unemployment 
rate for Scotland, β is the relative valuation of the public expenditure and the S and R 
                                                                                                                                                         
Communication, (TRA); Finance and Business Services, (FIN). Sheltered: Public Administration, (PAD); 
Education, Health and Social work, (EDU); and Other Services, (OTH). Manufacturing, (MAN); 
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superscripts stand for Scotland and the Rest of the world, respectively.17
( )ln ln( ) ln 1
S
S
S
w = b + 1.33 u  + 
cpi
β τ
 
− 
 
 In the long run, there 
is an implied zero-net-migration condition that yields estimates of the optimal spatial 
distribution of population. This is: 
 (17) 
where b again is a calibrated parameter.  Wage setting is determined by a regional bargained 
real wage function that embodies the econometrically derived specification given in Layard et 
al (1991), again augmented by amenity effects: 
( ) ( )ln 0.113ln ln 1
S
S
S
w  = c  u  + 
cpi
αβ τ
 
− − 
 
 (18) 
where α represents the extent to which the amenity effect is reflected in the wage bargain and c 
is a calibrated parameter. 
   
5. SIMULATION RESULTS  
 
In this section, we use AMOS to conduct simulations to illustrate the long-run effects of the 
Scottish Variable Rate on the Scottish economy.  Given that the model is parameterised on 
2004 data we use the 2004 HM Treasure Budget estimate that exercising these fiscal powers 
would raise £810 million at 2004 prices, which represents a 1.52 percentage point rise in 
average personal income tax in AMOS.   
 
5.1 Inter-regional migration and regional bargaining 
 
In Table 1 we report the long-run proportionate changes in Scottish employment after the 
introduction of such a tax for combinations of α and β, where α lies in the range 0 to 1 and β in 
the range 0 to 2. Figure 4 illustrates these results graphically.  These outcomes are consistent 
with the analytical results generate in Section 3.4. When the parameters α and β both take a 
value of unity, the employment change is positive at 0.68%. Recall that this case produces 
results that replicate the standard Keynesian balanced budget multiplier, although here the 
outcome depends on endogenous population and investment effects. Moreover, the level of 
                                                 
17 Equation (18) is estimated in terms of relative unemployment rates but these are just the inverse of the 
employment rate used in Sections 2 and 3. 
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employment change is positively related to the values of the parameters α and β. Even a 
relatively small reduction in the value of either of these parameters below unity leads to 
employment falling with a balanced budget fiscal expansion.  
 
A critical point is that once supply-side considerations are included, for a fiscal expansion to 
have a positive impact on employment, government expenditure must be valued by existing 
and potential Scottish residents. Where α = 1, so that the value of the consumption of the 
public good is fully reflected in the wage bargain, employment falls with a fiscal expansion for 
values of β less than 0.76: for α = 0.8, employment falls for values of β less than 0.93.  
 
However, equally, an increase in public expenditure that has a high marginal value for existing 
and potential Scottish residents will have a depressing aggregate long-run economic impact if 
these benefits are not incorporated into the wage bargain. In Table 1 results are shown for 
simulations where the maximum value of β is 2; that is, where marginal valuation of public 
expenditure is twice that of private expenditure. Even in this case, for values of α less than 
0.32, employment falls with a fiscal expansion. Where β equals unity, so that actual and 
potential Scottish residents are indifferent between marginal increases in private consumption 
and public expenditure, if α takes a value below 0.74, employment falls. This is represented by 
point H in Figure 1 and N in Figure 2. Again, where β = 0.8, employment falls for any value of 
α below 0.95. Note that where the labour market is perfectly competitive (α = 0), employment 
always falls with the range of values for β given here.  
 
In Table 2 we give the proportionate changes in a more comprehensive set of economic 
variables for four particular combinations of α and β. This allows a fuller investigation of the 
economic forces at work in each of these cases. In the first column we report results from 
simu latio n s wh ere α = β = 1 .  Th is is th e situation that corresponds to the conventional 
Keynesian balanced budget multiplier, albeit with endogenous investment and population. 
 
The key characteristic of this simulation is that there is no change in either the pre-tax nominal 
wage or the unemployment rate. This implies that there are no adjustments in long-run value-
added prices, the cost-minimising choice of production technique in each industry or the level 
of exports. Essentially the economy operates as an extended input-output system where, in 
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each sector, output, employment and capital stock vary by the same proportionate amount.18
 
 
The demand disturbance comes through the replacement of a proportion of private 
consumption expenditure by public expenditure. 
As argued in Sections 2 and 3, this has a general expansionary impact on the regional 
economy. The 3.77% increase in government expenditure produces an increase in Scottish 
GDP of 0.47% and in employment and population of 0.68%. However, the adjustment in 
consumption and government demand has an uneven effect across sectors. Value added in the 
sheltered sector, which is most strongly represented in government expenditure, increases by 
2.26%. In the other two sectors value added falls, but by a relatively small amount, -0.02%, in 
manufacturing and by -0.26% in non-manufacturing traded.  
 
The second column gives the simulation results with the parameter values α = 0 and β = 1.  
This simulation corresponds to the equilibrium represented by point D in Figure 1. Here 
private consumption and public expenditure are equally valued at the margin but this is not 
reflected in the bargained wage. We know from the previous analysis that with this 
combination of parameter values the nominal pre-tax wage and the unemployment rate rise. In 
this case the figures are 2.39% and 1.35% respectively. This generates a negative competitive 
effect. Value-added prices rise by 1.76% in Manufacturing, 1.56% in Non-Manufacturing 
Traded and by 1.94% in the Sheltered sector. Exports therefore fall in all sectors and this 
swamps any expansionary impacts generated by the other final demand shifts. Scottish GDP, 
total employment and population decline by 1.97%, 1.95% and 1.71% respectively, with 
activity falling in all sectors, though particularly the non-sheltered sectors. The decline in 
Scottish real income is associated with a smaller rise in the endogenous public expenditure, 
which increases by 1.69% with these parameter values.  
 
The results in the third column are derived where β = 0.  This corresponds to a situation where 
the amenity funded by the tax revenue has no value to existing or potential Scottish residents. 
The outcome is independent of the value of α and corresponds to point A in Figure 1. In this 
                                                 
18 The figures reported in Table 2 do not show this precisely because the results given for the three sectors are 
for aggregations of the 11 sectors in the model, as outlined in footnote 15. The long run changes in value added, 
employment and capital stock for all sectors specified in the model are: AGR (-0.30), MIN (-0.03), MAN (-0.02), 
ENE(-0.21), CON(0.80), DIS (-0.86), TRA(-0.24), FIN(-0.24), PAD(3.47), EDU(2.39), OTH(-0.14). 
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simulation there is no change in the post-tax real consumption wage or the unemployment rate. 
The nominal pre-tax wage increases by 2.60%, the full extent of the tax plus the rise in the 
consumer price index.  This results in an increase in value added prices in all sectors with a 
corresponding reduction in exports. The impact on individual sectors is qualitatively similar to 
the case where α = 0 and β = 1, except that the results here are more extreme. The percentage 
change in government expenditure is now 1.52% and Scottish GDP falls by 2.18%, with 
employment and population both decline by 2.17%. This is the "worst-case" scenario for the 
Scottish Variable Rate. 
 
The final simulation, reported in column four, adopts the parameter values α = 0.80, β = 1.20 
and represents an equilibrium lying in the area 0HML in Figure 1 where β > 1 and both 
employment and the nominal pre-tax wage increase. The 0.05% rise in the pre-tax nominal 
wage following the introduction of the Scottish Variable Rate reduces exports in all sectors.  
However, the other expansionary fiscal demand impacts produce a more than offsetting effect 
on overall Scottish aggregate activity.  Therefore, although there are small employment falls in 
the manufacturing and non-manufacturing traded sectors of 0.08% and 0.35%, employment in 
the sheltered sector rises by 2.20% producing an aggregate increase in GDP, total employment 
and population of 0.42%, 0.62% and 0.67% respectively. 
 
5.2 Inter-regional migration and national bargaining 
 
The results presented in the first column of Table 2 also give the outcome where there is 
national bargaining with the value of β = 1. The nominal wage and unemployment rate remain 
unchanged, and population rises by 0.68%. There is a positive stimulus to the Scottish 
economy that corresponds to the conventional Keynesian balanced budget multiplier. For 
alternative values of β under national bargaining, the changes in the unemployment rate and 
population level do vary so as to maintain the zero net migration requirement. But in the 
present parameterisation of the model, this has no direct impacts on household expenditure, so 
that the change in all other variables is as under column one of Table 2. Where β equals zero, 
so that the additional public expenditure has no value to Scottish residents, population rises by 
0.42% and the unemployment rate falls by 1.45%. On the other hand, where β = 1.2, 
population increases by 0.73% and the unemployment rate rises by 0.29%.  
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5.3 Zero population mobility and regional bargaining 
 
Table 3 shows the percentage changes in key variables for the fiscal expansion in a model with 
bargaining and zero population mobility. As discussed in Section 3.3, in this case the 
migration function is dropped and the bargaining function is affected by the product of the two 
parameters: αβ. This composite parameter measures the extent to which the increase in public 
expenditure is incorporated into reduced wage claims.  
 
The first column gives results where αβ = 1, which would correspond, inter alia, to the set of 
values α = 1, β = 1. In this case the public consumption is valued equally with private 
consumption and this is fully reflected in the bargaining function. In Figure 3 this is 
represented by a position where the bargaining function remains unchanged as a result of the 
fiscal expansion and still passes through the origin (the BRW function B0 in Figure 1). Here 
GDP increases by 0.17%, employment by 0.35% and the nominal pre-tax wage by 0.30%. 
Increased nominal wages lead to higher value added prices and exports fall in all sectors. 
Value added increases in the Sheltered sector, by 1.96%, but falls in the Manufacturing and 
Non-Manufacturing sectors by 0.32% and 0.58% respectively.  
 
The simulation results for α  = 0.8, β = 1.2 (so that αβ = 0.96) there is again a stimulus to GDP 
but here slightly lower with a slightly greater loss in competitiveness. The bargaining function 
moves upwards with the fiscal expansion to a position such as BA in Figure 3. Finally where 
αβ = 0, there is a decline in GDP, and employment by 1.22% and 1.14%. This corresponds to 
the simulations previously where β = 0 or where α  = 0, β = 1, and the bargaining function is 
given by B1 in Figure 3. In this case there a large reductions in exports in all sectors and 
although value added in the Sheltered sector rises by 0.63%, it falls in the Manufacturing and 
Non-Manufacturing Traded sectors by 1.69% and 2%. 
 
Table 4 gives the percentage change in employment for combinations of the parameters α and 
β with zero population mobility. It is instructive to compare these numerical results with 
theoretical analysis in Section 3.3 and Figure 3. First, note that where the employment change 
is positive for the model with zero population mobility, the employment change is greater for 
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the model incorporating inter-regional migration, reported in Table 1. These results are 
consistent with the situation represented by bargaining function BA and apply for values of αβ 
≥ 0.8.   
 
There is one set of parameters (α = 0.4, β = 1) where the employment change under zero 
population mobility is negative, but under inter-regional migration it is positive. There is also 
one set of parameters, where α  = 0.6, β = 1.2, where employment change in both models is 
negative, but the zero population mobility model has a larger negative value. Both cases are on 
the same bargaining function where αβ = 0.72, which corresponds to BB in Figure 3. 
 
In all other case, the employment falls in both models and the fall is greater where there is 
inter-regional migration. This applies where the value of αβ ≤ 0.64. It corresponds to the 
bargaining function BC in Figure 3    
 
6. THE ADJUSTMENT PROCESS AND SENSITIVITY  
 
6.1 Time Period of Adjustment 
 
The analysis in the paper deals with long-run equilibria. However, it is also important to 
consider the adjustment process so as to identify the length of time for equilibrium to be 
attained and the relevant shorter-run impacts. Figure 5a and 5b plot the period-by-period 
percentage changes for the Tobin’s q, disaggregated by sector, associated with the introduction 
of the Scottish Variable Rate. Figure 5a is for the case where α and β are both unity and Figure 
5b where both are zero. Note that the adjustment process, which depends on the interaction of 
migration, consumption and investment decisions, is relatively rapid where the two parameters 
are both unity but rather protracted for the case in which α and β are both zero. In the first case 
it it seems that the adjustment is complete something after 10 periods while in the second case 
takes almost 20 years for the Tobin’s q to achieve constant accumulation rate 
 
For α = β = 0 the short-run movements in sheltered sectors (Education and Public 
administration) differ markedly from their long-run solutions. In both these sectors there is 
initially a sharp increase in investment because these are sectors in which government 
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expenditure is more concentrated. However, after period 5, the value of Tobin’s q is below its 
initial value in all sectors due to the depression in economic activity. When α = β = 1, positive 
investment results occur not only in sheltered sectors but also in Construction. For all the other 
sectors, although there is a general expansion in economic activity with the introduction of the 
SVR, there is a long-run reduction in capital stock and therefore disinvestments. Most of these 
sectors are relatively open to inter-regional and international trade. The rise in the pre-tax 
bargained nominal wage has adverse competitiveness effects that reduce profit expectations in 
these sectors.  
 
6.2 Sensitivity Analysis 
 
One criticism of CGE models is that they are not econometrically estimated and that the 
results might be very sensitive to imposed parameter values. In the existing simulations, the 
values of the constant elasticity of marginal utility, the CES production substitution elasticities 
between labour and capital are 0.9 and 0.3. Also the substitution elasticities between locally 
produced and imported commodities used in production and final demand and the export 
demand price elasticity take the value 2.0. In this sensitivity exercise, the values of the 
constant elasticity of marginal utility are selected from the range (0.2 – 1.6), the production 
substitution elasticities from the range (0.1 - 0.5) and the trade elasticities from the range (0.1 - 
4.0).  
 
We assume that all the elasticities have uniform distributions that are symmetric about their 
means, which are the default point estimates in AMOS. Following Harrison and Vinod (1992), 
we divide the distribution into 4 equal intervals and since there are 66 elasticities selected, the 
set of all possible parameter perturbations is 466.  However, we adopt a complete randomized 
factorial design and selected only a subset (1000) of the possible configurations. Each of the 
1000 simulations is run for 50 periods. 
 
In Figures 6 and 7 we report the results of systematic sensitivity analysis on the period-by-
period simulations for two of the (α, β) combinations reported in Table 2: (1,1) and (0.8, 1.2). 
In each period the graphs show the mean solution value of the percentage increase in total 
employment of the 1000 simulations together with the plus-or-minus-one-standard-deviation 
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range of results.  Note that, in general, the one standard deviation confidence limits are small 
and fall over time. This is because in these two cases, migration and investment reduce the 
price deviations upon which the production and demand elasticities bite. This is particularly 
apparent in the simulation results reported in Figure 6, where α and β are both unity.  From 
Table 2 it is apparent that in this case extended Input-Output results hold in the long run: there 
are no relative price changes, so that variation in price elasticities play no role and the 
confidence range ultimately collapses to a single point (McGregor et al, 1996b). In Figure 7, 
where  (α, β) values are (0.8, 1.2), price changes are still present in the long run so that 
employment is still sensitive to these parameter values in this case.  
 
7. CONCLUSIONS  
 
In this paper we focus primarily on the potential impact on economic activity of the Scottish 
Parliament’s exercising its current limited degree of fiscal autonomy through implementing 
the Scottish Variable Rate. Algebraic and geometric approaches, using a stripped-down 
regional general equilibrium variant of the Layard et al (1991) model, provide powerful 
conceptual insights. These include extending the conventional balanced-budget multiplier 
analysis to accommodate the supply side in a long-run, regional context. Numerical CGE 
simulation results reinforce and extend this analysis.  
 
A key result is that the impact of a balanced fiscal expansion on regional economic activity 
depends crucially on the value that existing and potential residents place on the resulting 
public amenity and the extent to which this value is reflected in a moderation of local pay 
claims. Such moderation is not available in a perfectly competitive labour market where there 
is no mechanism to internalise the benefit of the publicly provided externality. Our simulation 
results suggest that the balanced budget employment multipliers would be negative in such 
circumstances. However, in an imperfectly competitive labour market, where unions are 
concerned with the general welfare of their members, or where the nominal wage is set 
exogenously, such inverted Haavelmo effects do not necessarily occur or might be offset by 
the positive demand effects. Under these circumstances there could be significant potential 
welfare benefits to Scotland from the use of this fiscal innovation. Up to now, the Scottish 
Government have not used the fiscal powers embodied in the Scottish Variable Rate. 
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However, if the recommendations of the Calman Commission are introduced, the probability 
that such powers will be used in the future is much increased. 
 
Future research could usefully extend the analysis in at least two directions. First, we have 
concentrated primarily on the consequences of exercising the existing degree of Scottish fiscal 
autonomy. While we have noted the relevance of this analysis to the wider debate on greater 
fiscal autonomy in the UK, many detailed aspects of such autonomy, including the possibility 
of more wide-ranging tax-varying powers, remain to be explored. Secondly, the single region 
context of our current analysis abstracts from any induced spillover and feedback effects, and 
is clearly incapable of providing an analysis of the UK devolution programme as a whole. For 
a UK-wide perspective we believe that it is important to develop an explicitly interregional 
approach that will facilitate, inter alia, investigation of the potential for gains through 
economic policy coordination among devolved authorities. 
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Appendix 1: Key Relationships from Section 2 Expressed as Total Differentials 
 
Equations (A1.1) to (A1.5) express as total differentials equations (1) to (5) in the text. These 
equations are generated given the following normalisation: w, W, N, cpi =1, τ = 0 and n = e. 
 
0e edw w de d wβ τ= − ≤  (A1.1) 
dW dcpi dw dτ= + +  (A1.2) 
1 0W Wdcpi cpi dW cpi= > ≥  (A1.3) 
0, 0W Wdn n dW n d n nτ ττ= + ≤ ≥  (A1.4) 
0e edw b de d bαβ τ= − ≥  (A1.5) 
 
Appendix 2: Forward Looking Consumption and Production 
 
A2.1. Consumer Preference 
 
The decision problem for the representative consumer is to choose a sequence of consumption 
that maximizes the present value of utility, as summarized by the lifetime utility function: 
dteCU tt
ρ∫
∞
0
)( ; σ
σ
−
−
= 1
1
1)( tt CCU ; (A2.1) 
discounted by the consumer’s rate of time preference ρ and with constant elasticity of marginal 
utility σ . The present value of consumption t
t
tCPct∑
∞
)(µ must not exceed total wealth, W; 
where ∏ −+=
t
trt
1)1()(µ  and tr  is the interest rate which is kept constant over time. In our 
configuration we distinguish between financial wealth (FW) and non financial wealth (NFW), 
such that ttt FWNFWW += and in which: 
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The variables tdnginsht
s
t TRSFwL ,,,, , ut and tτ  are respectively working population, nominal wage 
rate before tax, the transfer matrix between households (h) and domestic no-governmental 
institutions (dngins), the unemployment rate and the rate of income tax. The transfer from the 
Government (TRG), remittance (REM) and the exchange rate (ε ) are fixed.  
Financial Wealth (FW) evolves as follows: 
ttttt SFWrFW −Π+=+ +1)1(  (A2.3) 
where tΠ  and tS  are respectively capital income and saving. In the model saving can be 
obtained as a function of the current level of income and interest rate (which is the default 
closure)  
 
Once the optimal path of consumption is obtained, the aggregate consumption is allocated 
within each period for the i commodities and for five different groups of income. Household 
demand for regional and imported goods is the result of the intra-temporal cost minimization 
problem. 
 
A2.2. Technology  
 
A2.2.1 Production. Intermediate inputs (VV), labour (L) and capital (K) constitute the 
production inputs of the model. L and K are combined in a CES production function in order 
to produce value added, Y, allowing for substitution among primary factors of production 
while Leontief technology between VV and Y is imposed. Intermediate goods produced locally 
or imported are considered as imperfect substitutes. 
 
A2.2.2 Investment. The decision problem of the representative firm is to choose the path of 
investment that maximize the present value of its cash flow given by profit, tπ , less 
investment expenditure, I subject to the presence of adjustment cost ( )txg  where ttt KIx /= : 
Max ( )( )[ ]∫
∫
+−
−t dvr
ttt
t
v
exgI
0
01π  subject to ttt KIK δ−=  (A2.4) 
The solution of the dynamic problem gives us the law of motion of the shadow price of 
capital, tλ and the time path of investment related on the tax-adjusted Tobin’s q and an 
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adjustment cost parameter z :  






−−−= )1(1 kb
PkzK
I
t
t
t
t τ
λ
;      )/()( '
2
tt
t
t
ttt KIgK
IPkrkr 





−−+= δλλ ; (A2.5) 
where Pk is the replacement cost of capital, rk is the rate of return to capital and b is a 
calibrated parameter.  
 
The model calibration process assumes the economy to be initially in steady state equilibrium. 
The parameters of the models are obtained from the Scottish SAM for the year 2004 by means 
of the usual calibration method. The value of adjustment cost parameter z in equation (A2.5) is 
assigned values 1.5. The world interest rate is set to 0.04, the rate of depreciation to 0.15 and 
the constant elasticity of marginal utility σ  is equal to 0.9. Given the value of total 
investment, J, through the capital matrix, KMi,j, the equality condition with total investment by 
origin in the SAM holds true. The price of capital goods, Pk, is set equal to unity since the 
benchmark prices on the consumption side are set equal to unity. W corresponds to the 
discounted flow of current income, NFW to the discounted flow of net labour income, and FW 
is obtained by maintaining asset equilibrium.  
 
The model is solved by applying the usual procedure in solving an infinite time horizon 
model, by imposing steady state conditions at a specific point in time. 
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Table 1. Long-run % change in employment after the introduction of the Scottish 
Variable Rate with endogenous population 
    α 
    0.00 0.20 0.40 0.60 0.80 1.00 
β 
2.00 -1.73 -0.68 0.37 1.44 2.51 3.59 
1.80 -1.77 -0.83 0.12 1.07 2.03 3.00 
1.60 -1.82 -0.98 -0.14 0.71 1.56 2.42 
1.40 -1.86 -1.13 -0.39 0.34 1.09 1.83 
1.20 -1.90 -1.28 -0.65 -0.02 0.62 1.25 
1.00 -1.95 -1.43 -0.90 -0.38 0.15 0.68 
0.80 -1.99 -1.58 -1.16 -0.74 -0.32 0.10 
0.60 -2.04 -1.72 -1.41 -1.10 -0.78 -0.47 
0.40 -2.08 -1.87 -1.66 -1.45 -1.25 -1.04 
0.20 -2.12 -2.02 -1.92 -1.81 -1.71 -1.60 
0.00 -2.17 -2.17 -2.17 -2.17 -2.17 -2.17 
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 Table 2: Long-run % change in key economic variables following the imposition of the 
Scottish Variable Rate with endogenous population, for different values of α and β. 
  Regional Bargaining 
  α≡β≡1   α≡0 β≡1   β≡0   α≡0.8 β≡1.2 
GDP (Income measure) 0.47  -1.97  -2.18  0.42 
Consumption -1.23  -2.37  -2.47  -1.26 
Govt expend. 3.77  1.69  1.52  3.72 
Investment 0.11  -2.16  -2.35  0.06 
Nominal pre-tax wage 0.00  2.39  2.60  0.05 
Real post-tax wage -1.93  -0.15  0.00  -1.89 
         
Total employment 0.68  -1.95  -2.17  0.62 
Manufacturing -0.02  -2.61  -2.83  -0.08 
Non-Manufacturing -0.28  -3.03  -3.26  -0.35 
Sheltered 2.31  -0.16  -0.36  2.26 
Unemployment Rate 0.00  1.35  0.00  0.32 
Total population 0.68  -1.71  -2.17  0.67 
         
Price of value added        
Manufacturing 0.00  1.76  1.92  0.04 
Non-Manufacturing 0.00  1.56  1.69  0.04 
Sheltered 0.00  1.94  2.11  0.04 
         
Shadow price of capital        
Manufacturing 0.00  0.48  0.52  0.01 
Non-Manufacturing 0.00  0.48  0.52  0.01 
Sheltered 0.00  0.48  0.52  0.01 
  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Consumer Price Index 0.00  0.57  0.62  0.01 
         
Value added        
Manufacturing -0.02  -2.43  -2.63  -0.08 
Non-Manufacturing -0.26  -2.77  -2.97  -0.32 
Sheltered 2.26  -0.10  -0.30  2.20 
         
Capital stocks        
Manufacturing -0.02  -2.06  -2.23  -0.07 
Non-Manufacturing -0.24  -2.44  -2.63  -0.29 
Sheltered 2.01  0.13  -0.03  1.97 
         
Exports        
Manufacturing 0.00  -1.73  -1.88  -0.04 
Non-Manufacturing 0.00  -1.80  -1.95  -0.04 
Sheltered 0.00  -2.70  -2.92  -0.06 
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Table 3: Long-run % change in key economic variables following the imposition of the 
Scottish Variable Rate with population fixed 
 
Fixed Population Regonal Bargaining 
  
α≡β≡1 
 
α≡0,β≡1 
β≡0  α≡0.8 β≡1.2 
GDP (Income measure) 0.17 
 
-1.22 
 
0.11 
Consumption -1.38 
 
-2.02 
 
-1.40 
Govt expend. 3.51 
 
2.33 
 
3.46 
Investment -0.18 
 
-1.46 
 
-0.23 
Nominal pre-tax wage 0.30 
 
1.65 
 
0.35 
Real post-tax wage -1.71 
 
-0.70 
 
-1.67 
  
     Total employment 0.35 
 
-1.14 
 
0.29 
Manufacturing -0.35 
 
-1.81 
 
-0.41 
Non-Manufacturing -0.63 
 
-2.19 
 
-0.69 
Sheltered 2.00 
 
0.60 
 
1.95 
Unemployment Rate -1.97 
 
6.46 
 
-1.63 
Total population 0.00 
 
0.00 
 
0.00 
  
     Price of value added 
     Manufacturing 0.22 
 
1.21 
 
0.26 
Non-Manufacturing 0.19 
 
1.07 
 
0.23 
Sheltered 0.24 
 
1.34 
 
0.28 
  
     Shadow price of capital 
     Manufacturing 0.06 
 
0.33 
 
0.07 
Non-Manufacturing 0.06 
 
0.33 
 
0.07 
Sheltered 0.06 
 
0.33 
 
0.07 
  
     Consumer Price Index 0.07 
 
0.39 
 
0.08 
  
     Value added 
     Manufacturing -0.32 
 
-1.69 
 
-0.38 
Non-Manufacturing -0.58 
 
-2.00 
 
-0.64 
Sheltered 1.96 
 
0.63 
 
1.91 
  
     Capital stocks 
     Manufacturing -0.28 
 
-1.43 
 
-0.32 
Non-Manufacturing -0.52 
 
-1.77 
 
-0.57 
Sheltered 1.78 
 
0.71 
 
1.73 
  
     Exports 
     Manufacturing -0.22 
 
-1.20 
 
-0.26 
Non-Manufacturing -0.23 
 
-1.25 
 
-0.27 
Sheltered -0.34 
 
-1.87 
 
-0.40 
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Table 4. Long-run % change in employment after the introduction of the Scottish 
Variable Rate with population fixed. 
 
    α 
    0.00 0.20 0.40 0.60 0.80 1.00 
β 
2.00 -1.14 -0.54 0.05 0.64 1.21 1.78 
1.80 -1.14 -0.60 -0.06 0.46 0.99 1.50 
1.60 -1.14 -0.66 -0.18 0.29 0.75 1.21 
1.40 -1.14 -0.72 -0.30 0.11 0.52 0.93 
1.20 -1.14 -0.78 -0.42 -0.06 0.29 0.64 
1.00 -1.14 -0.84 -0.54 -0.24 0.05 0.35 
0.80 -1.14 -0.90 -0.66 -0.42 -0.18 0.05 
0.60 -1.14 -0.96 -0.78 -0.60 -0.42 -0.24 
0.40 -1.14 -1.02 -0.90 -0.78 -0.66 -0.54 
0.20 -1.14 -1.08 -1.02 -0.96 -0.90 -0.84 
0.00 -1.14 -1.14 -1.14 -1.14 -1.14 -1.14 
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Figure 1. The real wage bargaining and zero net migration functions represented in 
nominal pre-tax wage (dW) and employment rate (de) space 
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Figure 2. The zero employment change locus  
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Figure 3. Comparison between the flow migration equilibra and the zero labour mobility 
equilibria 
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Figure 4. The long run change in employmnet after the introduction of a tartan tax. 
Graphical representation of table 1 
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Figure 5. Percentage change adjustments in Tobin’s q over time 
 
Figure 5a: α =β=1 
 
 
 
Figure 5b: α =β=0 
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Figure 6. The sensitivity of the percentage change in total employment to parameter 
variability (for α = β =1) 
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Figure 7. The sensitivity of the percentage change in total employment to parameter 
variability (for α =0.8 and β=1) 
  
